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Abstract
In a moral hazard model with relationship-speci￿c investment (￿ hay￿ )
and limited liability (no ￿ stick￿ ), we compare two institutional regimes:
one without, and one with, ex-post incentives (￿ carrot￿ ). We examine
the welfare implications of introducing ￿ carrots￿ . We use this model to
analyze corporate sponsoring of academic research. Under restrictive
technological assumptions, the introduction of carrots meets certain
e¢ ciency criteria and cannot make the agent (researcher) worse o⁄.
These results no longer hold once we allow for a ￿ bang-for-your-buck￿
e⁄ect - which occurs when the researcher￿ s following the sponsor￿ s pre-
ferred strategy results in the principal (sponsor) being able to achieve
the same results with fewer investment dollars - in conjunction with
a concave value function for the sponsor. In this case, the introduc-
tion of carrots may be ine¢ cient and may make the agent worse o⁄.
However, if the agent is a monopolist, a renegotiation-proof contract
implies that the agent can never be made worse o⁄by the introduction
of carrots, and carrots never reduce social welfare.
1 Introduction
This paper examines a principal-agent model with moral hazard where nega-
tive ex-post incentives (￿sticks￿ ) are ruled out, while an ex-ante relationship-
speci￿c investment (￿hay￿ ) is a necessary precondition for any value creation.
As we shall see, the agent (and society) can, in such a setting, be made worse
o⁄by the introduction of positive ex-post incentives (￿carrots￿ ). It is natural
1to extend the stick-and-carrot metaphor - commonly used in discussions of
incentives - to include hay. Think of yourself as a horse owner. You can use
sticks or carrots to incentivize the horse. However, hay is a prerequisite for
the horse to be able to do anything at all. The importance of relationship-
speci￿c investments is recognized in the literature on the holdup problem
(e.g. Grout 1984, Hart & Moore 1988). In contrast to this literature, in our
model, speci￿c investment is contractible, implying that there is no holdup
problem. However, due to the moral hazard feature, underinvestment may
still occur.
The asymmetry between sticks and carrots is by now well-established;
it has been demonstrated experimentally (e.g. Andreoni et al. 2003). We
employ the limited-liability assumption - the extreme case where sticks are
ruled out entirely - for two reasons. First, we wish to highlight the relation-
ship between the use of hay and the use of carrots. Second, it seems to be
realistic in some real-world settings.
Our model captures some key characteristics of at least one type of real-
world interaction: corporate sponsoring of nonpro￿t research. First, com-
mercial credit is typically unavailable to fund nonpro￿t research, as it is not
geared towards yielding appropriable cash ￿ ows. Thus, upfront sponsoring
(hay) is an indispensible precondition for research activity. Second, nonpro￿t
researchers￿activities tend to be very di¢ cult to monitor or control. The re-
searcher may use a research strategy that will be bene￿cial for her, but does
not lead to an invention pro￿table for the sponsor.1 Hence the moral hazard
setting may be appropriate. Third and ￿nally, the sponsor-researcher rela-
tionship is a delicate one, subject to public scrutiny. Corporate sponsors are
vulnerable to charges of exploitation which might tarnish their reputation.
Thus, in reality a researcher typically cannot be punished for an unsuccessful
research project. This feature is captured by the limited-liability assumption
(introduced to the literature by Innes 1990; extended by Park 1995): an in-
centive contract cannot include monetary payments from the researcher to
the sponsor for any contingency.
In recent decades, universities and other nonpro￿t research institutions
have turned increasingly to corporate funding sources to supplement their re-
search budgets. Many intellectuals and academics have mixed feelings about
this trend. Is the universities￿grand mandate to expand and transmit knowl-
edge for the public good being compromised? A lively and wide-ranging
debate is addressing this and related questions (Geiger 1992; Press & Wash-
1The seminal articles on moral hazard where the methodology used in this paper was
developed looked at insurance markets (Mirrlees, 1975) or taxation (Guesnerie and Laf-
font, 1979). Holmstroem (1979) and Grossamn and Hart (1983) explore optimal incentive
contracts with moral hazard in general settings.
2burn 2000; Bok 2003). In this debate, one issue may have been overlooked:
The relationship between ex-ante research sponsoring and ex-post incentives.
One important aspect of the commercialization of academic research is an
increased reliance on ex-post incentives. These may take a variety of forms,
including for example intellectual property licensing arrangements (encour-
aged in the United States through the Bayh-Dole Act - see Mowery et al.
2001) or contractual ￿ milestones￿that qualify for follow-up funding. Acad-
emic policymakers have signi￿cant discretion in encouraging or restraining
the use of such incentives.
Consider the introduction of ex-post incentives into an academic research
environment that so far has relied on upfront funding. On the face of it, the
new incentive instrument is a good thing for all parties involved: It brings
in extra money, and if the contract is not consistent with the academic in-
stitution￿ s mission, it can always be refused. However, is it possible that the
new incentive instrument serves as a substitute for ex-ante funding? Could
the latter be reduced to the extent that the introduction of ex-post incen-
tives actually harms the institution￿ s objectives? Could society su⁄er as a
result? We employ a highly stylized moral hazard model to address these
questions. Jensen & Thursby (2001) also employ a moral hazard model to
analyze university-industry relations. However, their focus is di⁄erent. They
are concerned with downstream development of university inventions; in their
model, the private-sector licensee is the agent. In the present model, it is
the university researcher who is the agent. In our model, the agent￿ s non-
contractible choice variable is his choice of research strategy. This is our
counterpart of the ￿ e⁄ort￿variable in the moral hazard literature.
This paper￿ s setup is as follows. We ￿rst describe the ￿ baseline￿model,
derive its social optimum, and analyze the ￿ benchmark￿case in which the use
of the ex-post incentive instrument is not permitted. We compare this to the
case where it is permitted, and show that in the baseline model, the sponsor
will never induce the researcher to carry out its own research agenda unless
this agenda is socially superior, and the introduction of ex-post incentives
cannot reduce welfare or make the researcher worse o⁄. We then proceed to
an alternative do the baseline model, in which the researcher￿ s following of the
sponsor￿ s research agenda allows the latter to achieve the same results with a
reduced investment (the ￿ bang-for-your-buck assumption￿ ), and the sponsor
is interested in obtaining a speci￿c research result only. Under these altered
technological assumptions, the sponsor may use the incentive instrument to
induce a socially inferior research agenda; allowing the sponsor to use the
incentive instrument may actually result in a reduction in overall welfare or
the agent￿ s welfare.
32 The Baseline Model
There exists a research project which may be pro￿table for two parties, a
sponsor and a researcher. The researcher does not have the ￿nancial means
to conduct the research project, while the sponsor does not have the know
how. Therefore the two parties engage in a principal-agent relationship,
where the sponsor is the principal and the researcher is the agent.
Suppose that the research project has a potential value Vs for the spon-
sor and Vr for the researcher. However, these potential values depend on the
quality and infrastructure of the research environment, which are indexed
by a scalar I. It is convenient to de￿ne the index I so that it is propor-
tional to the researcher￿ s payo⁄ or ￿ value￿ . We can then consider two cases:
￿rst, the sponsor￿ s value function may be proportional to I as well. Second,
the sponsor￿ s value function may be strictly concave - implying that it can
be obtained from the researcher￿ s value function through a strictly concave
transformation. The ￿rst case is considered in the present section, and the
second case in the next section. This use of the index I is a parsimonious way
of expressing that the sponsor￿ s value function may be either more concave
than, or equally concave as, the researcher￿ s value function.
The quality of the research environment depends on an up-front invest-
ment of the sponsor. The cost to generate a research environment I is denoted
C(I). We assume the cost to increase in I: Additionally, we assume that fur-
ther improving the environment gets more expensive when the quality of the
environment increases:
C(0) = 0; C
0(0) = 0
C
0(I) > 0; C
00(I) > 0
Without any up-front investment of the sponsor the potential value is
zero for both the sponsor and the researcher:
Vs(I = 0) = 0
Vr(I = 0) = 0
Due to the de￿nition of I and to the fact that we are - for now - considering
the case where the two value functions are equally concave, the values of the









s = 0; V
00
r = 0
4For simplicity we assume that the project can only be a success or a failure
for the sponsor and for the researcher respectively. A successful project pays
the potential value, while a failure pays nothing. To capture the di⁄erent
objectives of the researcher and the sponsor we assume that a failure for the
researcher does not necessarily imply a commercial failure for the sponsor
and vice versa. We denote the probability of success for the sponsor by ps
and the probability of success for the researcher by pr. The joint probabilities
are denoted by pr
s, pr
￿s, p￿r
s , and p
￿r
￿s, where the minus sign denotes a failure.
Then the distribution of outcomes for a project is given by:2
p
r
s = pspr (1)
p
r
￿s = [1 ￿ ps]pr
p
￿r
s = ps[1 ￿ pr]
p
￿r
￿s = [1 ￿ ps][1 ￿ pr]
In order to incorporate the agency problem we allow the researcher to
in￿ uence the success probabilities by his research strategy E. To keep the
model simple we assume that the researcher has only two research strategies
to choose from. Research strategy R is favorable for the researcher while
research strategy S is the preferred strategy for the sponsor. A success for the
researcher - say a publication in a top journal - becomes more likely if research
strategy R is chosen. However, a research strategy tailored speci￿cally for
research publications reduces the probability of a commercial success for the
sponsor. Vice versa a commercially orientated research strategy increases the
likelihood of a success for a sponsor, whereas the probability for a research
publication is reduced. We assume the e⁄ort cost for both research strategies
to be the same. Then, without loss of generality, we can normalize these e⁄ort
cost to zero.3
ps(S) > ps(R) (2)
pr(R) > pr(S) (3)
This setup creates a moral hazard situation. The sponsor would like the
researcher to use his preferred research strategy S, but has no control over the
choice of strategy. The researcher de￿nitively wants to choose his favoured
2For simplicity we assume that the outcomes for the researcher and sponsor are drawn
independently. Allowing for correlation seems to be more realistic, but complexi￿es the
model without adding any insight.
3Error cost of zero may be interpreted as a univerity salary setting o⁄ the e⁄ort put
into the research. Alternatively we can interpret the value of the project as nat of e⁄ort
cost.
5research strategy R. Which strategy is implemented depends crucially on
the nature of the project and the contractual environment. It is clear that
the research strategy cannot be contractible. No court could possibly decide
without doubt whether a researcher used research strategy R or S. However,
we may allow the sponsor and the researcher to sign a research contract which
speci￿es transfers dependent on the outcome of the research project.
We restrict the outcome dependent transfers from the sponsor to the re-
searcher to be non-negative for all outcomes. The reason for this assumption
is the credit constraints of the researcher. Poor researchers do not have the
￿nancial means to pay ￿nes for outcomes which are unpleasant for the spon-
sor. We believe that it is realistic to assume that the researcher is not able to
pay transfers even if the project is a research success. Usually the payo⁄ for
a good research publication is non-monetary (reputation, status in the pro-
fession) or at least not immediate. This limited liability assumption restricts
the possible incentive contracts for the sponsor.
We are thus ruling out the use of ￿sticks￿ , which allows us to focus on
the relationship between ￿hay￿and ￿carrots￿ .
Additionally, we assume both players to be risk neutral.
2.1 Timing
We now explain the timing of the principal-agent game.
Stage 1 The sponsor o⁄ers a contract containing a commitment of an up-
front investment I and transfers depending on the outcome of the re-
search projects. Denote the non-negative transfers from the sponsor
to the researcher depending on the outcome as tr
s if the project was
successful for both, as t￿r
s if the project was only successful for the
sponsor, as tr
￿s if the project was only successful for the researcher, and
as t
￿r
￿s if the project was a total failure. As a benchmark case we will
use an environment where incentive contracts are not possible (i.e. all
transfers are zero).
Stage 2 The researcher accepts or rejects the proposed research contract. If
he rejects the project does not go ahead and the game ends. This take-
it-or-leave-it contractual environment gives all the bargaining power to
the sponsor.
Stage 3 The sponsor makes the up-front investment I speci￿ed in the agreed
contract:4
4We implicitely assume that the investment speci￿ed in the contract can be enforced
by a court.
6Stage 4 The researcher observes the investment and chooses the research
strategy, which can be S or R. The chosen research strategy determines
the probability distribution for the outcomes.
Stage 5 Nature determines the outcome of the project according to the
probabilities in equation (1) and the restrictions in inequalities (3) and
(2).
Stage 6 The payo⁄s for successful projects (Vr and Vs) are realized and
the transfer speci￿ed in the incentive contract for the actual outcome
realization is made.
2.2 Social optimum
Our model describes a world with imperfections. Due to a credit constraint
the researcher has to ￿nd a sponsor. The credit constraint is rather due to
the non-monetary nature of research success than due to imperfections in
the capital markets. Therefore, we can view our researcher as a scientist
with a preference for basic research.5 Thus, we can regard the payo⁄ for the
researcher as an approximate measure of welfare created by positive exter-
nalities of basic research. The welfare created by the a commercial success
of the research project can be approximated by the payo⁄ of the sponsor.
Consequently, we use the sum of the expected values of the research projects
net of investment as a measure for social welfare.6
W = ps(E)Vs + pr(E)Vr ￿ C(I)
Hence, the socially optimal investment for a given research strategy is given
by:
C
0(I) = ￿ps(E) + ￿pr(E) (4)
Note that the optimal investment is greater for research strategy R if
￿ps(R) + ￿pr(R) > ￿ps(S) + ￿pr(S)
or
￿[pr(R) ￿ pr(S)] > ￿ [ps(S) ￿ ps(R)]; (5)
5The preferences can be intrinsic or ￿induced￿by the reward system in the profession.
6Not that it may be reasonable to use weights for the values in order to capture the
possibility that the surplus created is not entirely internalized by the markets.
7which can be interpreted as a situation where the gain of using the research
strategy R for the researcher o⁄sets the loss the sponsor has to endure. Con-
sequently, condition (5) determines which research strategy is socially opti-
mal. De￿ning the relative value of the project for basic research ￿ as
￿ =
￿[pr(R) ￿ pr(S)]
￿ [ps(S) ￿ ps(R)]
(6)
we can say that it socially optimal to use research strategy R, whenever
￿ > 1. For ￿ < 1 research strategy S is socially optimal. For ￿ = 1 both
research strategies are equally appropriate from the point of view of a social
planer.
2.3 The benchmark case
As a benchmark case we look at the situation where transfer payments de-
pending on the outcome of the project are not permitted. Then we can
evaluate the in￿ uence incentive contracts have on e¢ ciency and distribution
of surplus between the two parties. Solving backwards shows that with-
out any incentive contracts the researcher implements his preferred research
strategy R, since the expected payo⁄ from doing so is always greater than
the expected payo⁄ from implementing research strategy S:
EUr(R) = pr(R) ￿ Vr(I) > EUr(S) = pr(S) ￿ Vr(I) 8I
This is true because due to the assumption in equation (3) the probability
of success for the researcher is always greater under the research strategy R:
Given that the researcher always implements R the forward-looking sponsor




fps(R) ￿ Vs(I) ￿ C(I)g
which leads to the ￿rst order condition
C
0(I) = ￿ps(R) (7)
The second-order condition is satis￿ed by assumption. An interior solution
is guaranteed with the assumptions made above
It is apparent that the optimal investment for the sponsor I increases
with his probability of success ps(R). Additionally, the expected equilibrium
payo⁄ of the sponsor in the case that incentive contracts are impossible in-
creases with ps(R). A corollary of this ￿nding is that a sponsor always prefers
8the researcher to implement the research strategy S, which may give rise to
the desirability of incentive contracts from the sponsor￿ s point of view.





B is the investment that solves the ￿rst-order condition (7). (The
subscript ￿B￿refers to the ￿Benchmark￿case.)
Note that the expected payo⁄ in this case is positive.
2.4 Incentive contracts
In the previous section we established that the sponsor would like the re-
searcher to pursue research strategy S. However, without any incentive in-
strument the researcher will choose to pursue his favoured research plan R.
We will introduce two di⁄erent contracting environments. First we allow
contracts to be written contingent on the outcome of the researcher and the
sponsor. However, later we argue that an environment where only the success
of the sponsor is contractible is more realistic.
2.4.1 Outcomes for both are contractible
Suppose that the sponsor can o⁄er a research contract which includes trans-
fers (bonuses) depending on the outcome of the research project. Contracts
that condition directly on the research strategy are not feasible, since a re-
search strategy is hardly veri￿able in court. Before the sponsor invests in
the project he o⁄ers a contract, which speci￿es non-negative bonuses for the






s is the pay-
ment in case the project is successful for both agents, while t
￿r
￿s denotes the
payment for a failure for both parties.7 The researcher can decide to accept
or to reject this contract. If the contract is accepted, the sponsor invests, be-
fore the researcher conducts the research. In the case of rejection the game
ends with a payo⁄ of zero for both and the sponsor searches for another
researcher. In a later section we will examine the case where the sponsor
cannot ￿nd another researcher and in case of rejection renegotiation takes
place.
A contract that provides an incentive for the researcher to follow the
sponsor￿ s preferred research strategy S has to satisfy the following incentive-
compatibility constraint:
EUr(S jT) ￿ EUr(RjT) (IC)
7Note that due to the revelation principle no more complex mechanism has to be taken
into account than a incentive compatible contract in the proposed form.
9Simplifying the incentive constraint leads to the following condition






































Instead of the usual participation constraint we use the constraint that
all transfers have to be non-negative. This corresponds to our assumption




s ￿ 0; t
￿r
s ￿ 0; t
r
￿s ￿ 0; t
￿r
￿s ￿ 0 (IR)
The sponsor wants to o⁄er the cheapest incentive-compatible contract
given the constraint above. It follows that the optimal transfer in the case
that the project is only a success for the researcher has to be zero, since
a positive tr
￿s would provide the wrong incentives as pr
￿s(S) ￿ pr
￿s(R) < 0.
There are three possible transfers to incentivize the researcher. The strongest
incentives are provided by a transfer t￿r







s (S) ￿ p￿r
s (R)
Vr
2.4.2 Only the sponsor￿ s outcome is contractible
It is reasonable to assume that the researchers￿outcomes are noncontractible.
In the present model, including those outcomes as contractible items would
imply that, as a result of the researcher achieving success on the academic
front, his payo⁄would be lowered! The reason for this is that academic pub-
lications would count as evidence rendering it more likely that the researcher
did not pursue the sponsor￿ s agenda. Such a contract would be hard to
￿ sell￿in public-relations terms for real-world sponsors. Moreover, the spon-
sor is likely to be more familiar with research outcomes that follow his own
agenda, and is thus better placed to negotiate the inclusion of such outcomes
in contractual provisions.
In this case the participation constraint stays the same, while the incentive
constraint becomes
[pr(R) ￿ pr(S)]Vr ￿ [ps(S) ￿ ps(R)]ts + [ps(R) ￿ ps(S)]t￿s (IC2)
It is obvious that t￿s = 0 is optimal, since due to ps(R)￿ps(S) < 0 a positive









t￿s = 0 (9)
If the sponsor chooses to o⁄er this contract his optimal investment is deter-













The ￿rst order condition becomes
C
0(I) ￿ ￿ps(S)[1 ￿ ￿]: (10)
Note that the optimal investment for a research project, which should be
conducted with research strategy R from a social point of view (￿ > 1),
never leads to a positive investment if the sponsor wants to enforce research
strategy S.
Comparing the optimal investments if an incentive contract is used and
if not we ￿nd that for




the quality of the environment I￿
c in the contract case is smaller than in
the non-contract case I￿
B.8 However, it is not clear whether the sponsor
really wants to use an incentive contract. Recall that for ￿ ￿ 1 an incentive
contract leads to I = 0; which leaves the sponsor with a zero payo⁄. The
project is abandoned. However, by not o⁄ering a contract an investment
of I￿
c is induced and the payo⁄ for the sponsor is pr(R)Vr(I￿) ￿ C(I￿) > 0.
Consequently, the sponsor does not o⁄er a contract in this situation.
Proposition 1 If a research strategy R is socially optimal (￿ ￿ 1) the spon-
sor never induces S with an incentive contract.
This positive result in terms of e¢ ciency - a research project that should
be tackled with research strategy R is never tackled with a research strategy S
- brings up the question whether the possibility of incentive contracts always
induces the research strategy S if it would be socially optimal. The answer is
no. Only if beta is su¢ ciently small the sponsor chooses to o⁄er an incentive
contract in order to induce the optimal research strategy S.
8To see this recall that due to the properties of C(I) I < I0 follows from C0(I) < C0(I0):
Then comparing the ￿rst order conditions (10) and (7) gives the claimed result.
11Proposition 2 The sponsor only o⁄ers a incentive contract that induces
research strategy S if ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ps(R)=ps(S).
Proof. We can write the di⁄erence between expected payo⁄s with an incen-















Observe that this di⁄erence is equal to zero for ￿ = 1 ￿ ps(R)=ps(S); since
the term in brackets vanishes and since condition (11) implies I￿
c = I￿ and
therefore C(I￿) ￿ C(I￿
c) = 0. The sponsor is indi⁄erent between using an
incentive contract and not. Now suppose ￿ increases above that level, due to



































So for a ￿ > 1 ￿ ps(R)=ps(S) the sponsor prefers not to o⁄er an incentive
contract.
For the other parameters that determine ￿, including ￿, ps(S) and ps(R),
a similar proof is available.
Corollary 3 For ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ps(R)=ps(S) the availability of an incentive con-
tract improves welfare, while for ￿ > 1 ￿ ps(R)=ps(S) the availability of
incentive contracts leaves welfare unchanged.
Proof. The second part is obvious. For ￿ > 1￿ps(R)=ps(S) the sponsor will
not choose to o⁄er a contract. So nothing changes to the situation where no
contract is available. For ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ps(R)=ps(S) the sponsor induces S by an
incentive contract, which is socially optimal, since ￿ < 1. Additionally, the
quality of the research environment is weekly higher than without a contract
(condition 11), but never higher than socially optimal. To see this compare
the ￿rst-order conditions (4) and (10). So an incentive contract makes sure
that for ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ps(R)=ps(S) (a) the socially optimal research strategy is
used and that (b) the quality of the research environment is closer to the
optimum.
123 Alternative value functions: Concavity and
Bang-For-Your-Buck
In this section, we attempt to express mathematically the di⁄erences between
the objectives that the sponsor and researcher are likely to have. To this end,
we develop an alternative function for the sponsor that express three features:
First, diminishing returns would typically set in for more quickly for the
sponsor than for the researcher. This translates into strict concavity. Second,
we would like to express the feature that the sponsor is solely interested in
a speci￿c research outcome. These ￿rst two features re￿ ect the fact that
corporate sponsors tend to not only favor a more applied research agenda,
but also one that is geared towards the sponsor￿ s very speci￿c needs. As
these needs are (close to) being met completely, the sponsor may lose interest
in working with the researcher. In contrast, the possibilities for expanding
fundamental research are practically endless. Third, we want to explore the
possibility that the sponsor￿ s value function is enhanced under the sponsor￿ s
research agenda. Such an enhancement of the value function can take a
variety of forms. Here, we are speci￿cally interested in an ￿increased-focus￿
or ￿bang-for-your-buck￿e⁄ect which gives the sponsor equal value at a lower
investment.
Now the sponsor￿ s value function is assumed to depend not only on I,
but also on the researcher￿ s strategy E. Let us assume that this function
is strictly concave. A parsimonious way of modeling this is to assume a
quadratic function: Vs (I;R) = ￿I ￿ (￿=2)I2, where ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0:
This functional form has the advantage that the degree of concavity is
expressed by a single parameter, ￿. However, the quadratic value function
possesses the undesirable property of being downward-sloping beyond its
maximum. This would be a distinctly unnatural element in our model. Now
recall our second feature: That the sponsor is solely interested in a speci￿c
research outcome. This feature can be re￿ ected through the assumption
that the function does not decrease but remains constant at its maximum,
if investment is increased further. Our third desired feature is some kind of
￿bang-for-your-buck￿assumption. Such an e⁄ect can be captured through
a single parameter ￿ > 1 which makes an investment I = e I combined with
research strategy S result in the same value e Vs as an investment I = ￿e I
combined with research strategy R. This assumption can be formulated for
any functional form of Vs (I;R) as Vs (I;S) = Vs (￿I;R). Thus our three
assumptions imply the following value functions for the sponsor:
Vs (I;R) =
￿
￿I ￿ (￿=2)I2 for I < ￿=￿




￿￿I ￿ (￿2￿=2)I2 for I < ￿=￿￿
￿2=2￿ for I ￿ ￿=￿￿
￿
The researcher￿ s value function is assumed to be the same as in the previ-
ous section. For this reason, the incentive contract is still given by equations
(8) and (9). To obtain a complete parametric solution, we assume that the
cost function is also quadratic (although this is not necessary for any of our
propositions):
C (I) = (￿=2)I2
Under the revised assumptions, we solve for social welfare (which we still
assume to be given by W = ps(E)Vs +pr(E)Vr ￿C(I)), the research quality
index I and the players￿payo⁄s. As before, the solutions of the incentive-
contracting case are obtained by plugging the expression for the incentive
contract from (8) and (9) into the sponsor￿ s objective function.
Let I￿
￿ (E) and W ￿
￿ (E) denote the socially optimal research environment
index and the resultant welfare, conditional on research strategy E, and







Ps(R)￿+￿ for [Pr (R)￿￿=￿￿] < 1
Pr(R)￿


















Ps(S)￿2￿+￿ for [Pr (S)￿￿￿=￿￿] < 1
Pr(S)￿
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Pr (R) ￿ Pr (S)






14The solutions for I￿
￿ (E) and W ￿
￿ (E) have di⁄erent expressions before
and after the sponsor￿ s value function reaches its maximum. These solutions
are nevertheless continuous functions. The solutions for the benchmark and
contract cases only have one expression each because the sponsor￿ s optimal
I will always occur before his value function reaches its maximum. This
is because at the value function￿ s maximum, marginal value is zero while
marginal cost is positive.
Based on these solutions, a series of propositions can be derived. First,
we consider what happens when ￿ = 1. Then, we￿ ll allow for ￿ > 1.
Proposition 4 Assume ￿ = 1. If a research strategy R is socially optimal
the sponsor may nevertheless induce S with an incentive contract.
Proof. We need to show that there exist parameter values such that W ￿
￿ (R) >
W ￿
￿ (S) while EUS (I￿
C) > EUS (I￿
B). Find parameter values with a small
enough di⁄erence Pr (R)￿Pr (S) such that EUS (I￿
C) > EUS (I￿
B) holds. For
this value of the di⁄erence Pr (R)￿Pr (S), the di⁄erence of squares Pr (R)
2￿
Pr (S)
2 is also a given strictly positive number. Now let ￿ approach zero. This
implies that the second expression in the welfare expressions becomes the only
relevant one. As ￿ goes to zero, the term [Pr(R)2￿Pr(S)2]￿2
2￿ will explode and will
thus be the dominant term in the comparison W ￿
￿ (R) ￿ W ￿
￿ (S), which will
therefore be positive. Thus there exist positive values of Pr (R)￿Pr (S) and
￿ such that both W ￿
￿ (R) > W ￿
￿ (S) and EUS (I￿
C) > EUS (I￿
B).
This result shows that under the altered assumptions Proposition 1 no
longer holds. The sponsor may now choose to induce strategy S even though
R is socially optimal. This occurs because of the diminishing returns in
the sponsor￿ s value function. The sponsor does not take into account that
the researcher￿ s value function features constant returns. For this reason, the
sponsor￿ s underinvestment relative to the social optimum may be exacerbated
by the introduction of the ex-post incentive instrument.
Proposition 5 Assume ￿ = 1. The researcher can be made worse o⁄ by the
introduction of incentive contracts.
Proof. We need to show that there exist parameter values such that EUR (I￿
C) <
EUR (I￿
B) while EUS (I￿
C) > EUS (I￿
B). We can set ￿ such that ￿￿
Pr(R)￿Pr(S)
Ps(S)￿Ps(R)￿
is arbitrarily close to zero. Thus we can set both I￿
C and EUS (I￿
C) arbitrar-
ily close to zero. Now, reduce both Ps (S) and Ps (R) so that the di⁄erence
Ps (S) ￿ Ps (R) remains constant but Ps (R) goes to zero. By doing this, we
can reduce EUS (I￿
B) to a number even smaller than EUS (I￿
C); no matter
15how small we have already made EUS (I￿
C). As Ps (R) goes to zero, I￿
B con-
verges to a positive number 1=￿; and therefore EUR (I￿
B) converges to some
positive number. As we could have initially set I￿
C , and therefore EUR (I￿
C),
arbitrarily close to zero, we can guarantee that EUR (I￿
C) < EUR (I￿
B) while
EUS (I￿
C) > EUS (I￿
B).
In contrast to the ￿rst section￿ s model, this section￿ s assumptions allow
for the possibility that the researcher is being made worse o⁄by the introduc-
tion of incentive contracts. This result, like the previous one, is accounted for
by the discrepancy between the sponsor￿ s value function and the researcher￿ s
value function, with the former exhibiting diminishing returns while the lat-
ter has constant returns. The proof indicates under which conditions the
perverse result will occur. With a high level of ￿, the researcher must receive
a high transfer per each invested dollar. This, combined with the diminishing
returns, prompts the sponsor to o⁄er only a very low level of investment in
the contract case. In the benchmark case, the sponsor would o⁄er a higher
level of investment, which however yields a lower overall payo⁄than the con-
tract case because of the combination of diminishing returns and the very
low probality of research success Ps (R) .
Let us now allow for ￿ > 1. The presence of a bang-for-your-buck e⁄ect
will make it more attractive for the sponsor to induce a contract:
Proposition 6 As ￿ increases, the set of parameter values for which the
sponsor prefers to o⁄er a contract expands unambigiously.
Proof. An increase in ￿ allows the sponsor to achieve equal Vs (I;S) at
lower I, but leaves both VS (I;R) and ts unchanged.
It is not clear whether investment under a contract will be increased as a
result of the bang-for-your-buck e⁄ect:
Proposition 7 As a result of ￿ > 1, compared to the case ￿ = 1, I￿
C may
be increased or reduced. For values of ￿ close enough to zero, I￿
C will be
increased, while for values of ￿ that are high enough (i.e., above a threshold
value), I￿
C will be reduced.
Proof. For a given ￿ > 1, as ￿ goes to zero, so does the term Ps (S)￿2￿
, which is part of the denominator of I￿
C . The e⁄ect of having ￿ in the
numerator will thus dominate the e⁄ect of having ￿ in the denominator.
The reverse is true for a su¢ ciently large ￿.
Corollary 8 For su¢ ciently low ￿, as a result of ￿ > 1, compared to the
case ￿ = 1, the likelihood of the researcher being made worse o⁄ as a result
of the introduction of contracts is being reduced. With su¢ ciently high ￿, as
16a result of ￿ > 1, compared to the case ￿ = 1, the likelihood of the researcher
being made worse o⁄ as a result of the introduction of contracts is being
increased.
Proof. Follows from the preceding two propositions. The likelihood of the
researcher being made worse o⁄depends on the range of parameter values for
which this is the case. By proposition 6, the presence of ￿ > 1 increases the
set of parameter values for which the sponsor prefers to use a contract. And,
by proposition 7, for su¢ ciently low ￿, the presence of ￿ > 1 bene￿ts the
researcher in case a contract is chosen, due to a higher I￿
C - as indicated by
the expression for EUR (I￿
C):Conversely, for su¢ ciently high ￿, the presence
of ￿ > 1 harms the researcher in case a contract is chosen, due to a lower I￿
C.
The bang-for-your-buck e⁄ect thus makes the researcher more likely to
bene￿t from the introduction of incentive contracts if the sponsor￿ s value
function is only slightly concave, while it makes the researcher more likely to
be harmed by the introduction of incentive contracts if the sponsor￿ s value
function is strongly concave. In case of a linear value function for the sponsor
as in section 1, the researcher will bene￿t from the bang-for-your-buck e⁄ect.
In this case, the increased productivity of investment makes it only more
attractive for the sponsor to o⁄er a contract combined with a high level of
investment. However, in case of strongly diminishing returns for the sponsor,
the bang-for-your-buck e⁄ect implies that the sponsor can achieve the same
results at a lower cost due to a reduced investment by inducing E = S. The
bang-for-your-buck e⁄ect means that the diminishing returns occur sooner,
i.e. already at a low level of I.
4 Bargaining Power
We have seen in the previous section that a researcher can be made worse o⁄
by the introduction of incentive contracts for speci￿c value functions. This
result crucially depends on the timing described in section 2.1. Implicitely
the timing gives all the bargaining power to the sponsor. This is re￿ ected
by the sponsor making a take it or leave it o⁄er to the researcher. In reality
a sponsor has all the bargaining power whenever there are many researchers
that could potentially conduct the research project. In the case where the
research project is very speci￿c and can only be conducted by a certain
researcher with abilities speci￿c to the project the researcher would have all
the bargaining power. For such a situation our timing assumption is not
appropriate. To see this imagine the researcher knows that the he is the only
17person that can possibly conduct the reasearch project in question. Then
the researcher may decline a contract o⁄er which is not favourable for him,
knowing that the sponsor will come back an renegotiate. The sponsor will do
so if the research project generates an expected surplus. In the case where
the sponsor has all the bargaining power this surplus will entirely go to the
sponsor.
An alternative setting for a non-replaceable researcher would be the re-
searcher proposing a contract. As the ￿rm is assumed to be risk-neutral and
limited liability does not apply, the reserach contract would maximize the ex-
pected return for the researcher subject to the constraint that the expected
return for the ￿rm is zero. Then the whole expected surplus would be ab-
sorbed by the researcher. Such a contract could include an investment and
a ￿xed wage payment for the researcher. If incentive contract are feasible an
additional bonus for a project that leads to a success for the sponsor would
be part of the contract. However, in such a framework the feasibility of an
incentive contract can never make the researcher worse o⁄ as he would just
not propose a contract containg an incentive component if it would lead to
an inferitor outcome.
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